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Abstract
The paper discusses the possible implications of the challenges facing the “European Social Model”
(ESM) caused by the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the enlargement of the EU to include central
and eastern European countries. The strains produced by the two challenges on the European welfare
states and industrial relation systems are regarded as considerable, adding to the wide variety of country-
specific solutions and leading to increased inequality both across and within member countries. However,
there are no signs indicating that the two challenges lead to the abolition of welfare standards, despite the
need for “recalibration,” or that labor market institutions are being dismantled. On the contrary, the need
to search for viable alternatives to the status quo appears to strengthen attempts to improve the long-term
sustainability of welfare states and to improve the performance of established labor market institutions.
Moreover, the challenges foster new European policy approaches like the “open coordination”
mechanism.
 
 
Zusammenfassung
Der Aufsatz diskutiert mögliche Folgewirkungen der gleichzeitigen Herausforderung des „Europäischen
Sozialmodells“ durch die Europäische Währungsunion und die Erweiterung der EU um mittel- und
osteuropäische Länder. Die Belastungen, denen die europäischen Sozial- und Lohnverhandlungssysteme
durch diese Herausforderungen ausgesetzt werden, sind beachtlich und verstärken sowohl die derzeitige
große Varianz länderspezifischer Problemlösungen als auch die zwischen- und innerstaatliche
Ungleichheit. Allerdings gibt es keine Anzeichen, daß die Herausforderungen zur Abschaffung
wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Standards oder zur Demontage von Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen führen. Im Gegenteil
scheint die Notwendigkeit der Suche nach tragfähigen Alternativen zum Status Quo Versuchen zur
Verbesserung der langfristigen Nachhaltigkeit der Wohlfahrtsstaaten und der Leistungsfähigkeit etablierter
Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen Nachdruck zu verleihen. Darüber hinaus fördern die Herausforderungen neue
europäische Politikansätze wie den Mechanismus der „offenen Koordinierung“.
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1 Introduction
 
After five decades in which supranational integration has progressed sometimes in small
stepts and sometimes in great leaps, European societies reached a new level of integration
during the last decade. The full realization of the internal market and the monetary union
mark the extent to which integration has deepened. And the upcoming enlargement of the
European Union to include central and eastern European countries (CEEC) to the
European Union signifies another step toward the realization of the vision of a united
Europe already laid down in principle in the original EEC treaties.
 
While this acceleration of the integration process has indisputable merits, in particular with
regard to the original intention of European integration to create an area of enduring peace,
some reservations are expressed concerning the implications of this rapid development.
One prominent issue put forward as a possible negative implication is the expectation that
the effects of macroeconomic growth from integration may be accompanied by an increase
in individual risks regarding social security and income maintenance in the current EU
member states. This development might well lead to a redesign of the concept of welfare in
Europe, a vision which Wolfgang Streeck (2000) has captured in the term “competitive
solidarity”.
 
 In this paper, I will discuss the current state of research concerning the welfare
implications of European Monetary Union and EU enlargement. In the following, I will
consider the effect that these two choices made by the EU member states may have on the
European Social Model. Drawing from and summarizing the current literature, I will briefly
outline the main effects of the monetary union and then present some propositions on the
possible impacts of the enlargement process. I will conclude with some reflections on the
directions in which solutions are sought. I would like to mention here that the literature
dealing with each of these subjects is rather loosely connected at present, and it will take
considerable effort in the next few years to attain a more integrated perspective. Since I am
talking about future developments, my inferences are drawn from projections, forecasts,
and expectations. Hence, these inferences are -at best- only as good as the assumptions on
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which these projections are based.
 
 
 
2 The European Social Model
 
Does the European Social Model (ESM) exist? Given the bewildering variety of welfare
state systems and labor market coordination modes that we find in the member states of
the European Union, we might despair and give up the search for a common European
framework. There have been important attempts at developing a typology of welfare state
systems, beginning with the contributions first by Esping-Andersen (1990) and later by
Castles and Mitchell (1993). They have been extended and modified in various ways (e.g.,
Obinger and Wagschal 1998; Kraus 2000), but all approaches end up dividing Western
Europe into three or four, more or less homogeneous groups of countries representing
particular “families of nations”: an “Anglo-Saxon,” a “Scandinavian,” a “Southern,” and a
“Continental” family. While there remains disagreement about the exact classification of
borderline cases, family membership tends to be stable over time, indicating the difficulty
of changing an incrementally grown and heavily institutionalized system (Pierson 1996).
 
However, other authors have pointed out a couple of common traits that can be regarded
as an undisputed acquis of all Western European countries and that differentiate these
countries from other parts of the world. In this perspective, the concept of a social model is
highly abstract and refers to the basic approach to organizing societal redistribution, which
consists of several dimensions. The common traits of the “European Social Model” can be
summarized as being
an extensive basic social security cover for all citizens,
a high degree of interest organization and coordinated wage bargaining,
a relatively egalitarian wage and income distribution (Ferrera, Hemerijck, and
Rhodes 2000a: 13).
These elements, which should be regarded as principles rather than as a real-world
description, are certainly implemented in different ways and to different degrees in the
member states of the European Union. Also, different approaches, legacies, traditions, and
social framework conditions influence the empirically observable solutions to the social
model. It is this variety that fosters the debate on the future of the European Social Model.
 
I will argue that pressures on the ESM come from two important developments that can be
regarded as inherently political in nature although they exert their pressure via economic
and social channels. In part, the impact on the welfare state may be an unintended
consequence of otherwise well-intended policies directed at extending welfare to a greater
number of people. But jointly, they may well endanger the acquis of the ESM, putting in
particular the economically disadvantaged into an even worse situation. The first
development is the creation of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) as the final stage of
economic integration of the European Union (EU), the second is the upcoming enlargement
of the EU.
 
 
 
3 EMU and the European Social Model
 
While initially conceived as a political project aimed at securing a peaceful order,
European integration has been, in practice, largely an economic process driven by political
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will (Ziltener 2001). As early observers have noted, it was hoped that economic integration
would spill over into other societal dimensions (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). In the
course of the implementation of the latest and most encompassing step of economic
integration, the European Monetary Union, it became apparent that the monetary union
indeed had implications for societal dimensions hitherto scarcely covered at the European
level. The decision to shift monetary policy to the European level led to a series of
adjustment processes in the European countries during the 1990s, which not only induced
strategic changes in fiscal and wage/incomes policies but also led to institutional change
intended to improve the ability of the countries to adjust to asymmetric developments in
the EMU (Enderlein 2002). At the same time, social policy was included in the agenda of
the European institutions (Pierson and Leibfried 1995: 457-462). On the one hand, this
development was a consequence of three things: the weakening of the unanimity rule in the
Council that had made the Social Protocol possible; the Commission’s ambitious search for
extended areas of activity; and decisions of the European Court of Justice, which not only
enforced free market principles undermining national social provisions but also became an
important driving force of European social legislation in the 1990s. On the other hand, this
development was also a -probably unintended- side effect of the pressure exerted on
national policies by the consequences of adjustment policies to EMU.
 
These had implications for the European Social Model. Fears were expressed that
enhanced economic integration would foster social dumping, characterized by a downward
adjustment of social provisions, deregulation, and decentralization of wage bargaining
institutions. As a result, income differentials would increase, thereby undermining the
social base of societal solidarity. However, aggregate data on social expenditure (Castles
2001) and the available evidence on the development of bargaining institutions (Traxler,
Blaschke and Kittel 2001) do not support these assertions. While the implications for the
first two areas remain ambiguous (Leibfried and Pierson 1995: 70-74), it is evident that the
egalitarian dimension of the European Social Model has suffered.
 
 
3.1 EMU and Social Security
 
The EMU contributes to the pressure on welfare systems mainly in two ways. First, the
Maastricht convergence criteria for entry into the EMU concerning inflation (within 1.5
percentage points of the average of the three lowest rates in Europe), long-term interest
rates (within 2 percentage points of the average of the three lowest inflation rates),
exchange rates (within the normal band for at least 2 years), and in particular a sound fiscal
position (ceilings at a debt/GDP ratio of 60 percent and a deficit/GDP ratio of 3 percent)
forced the member states striving to qualify for the EMU to pursue severe austerity policies
(see, e.g., Wyplosz 1997). Moreover, the “unholy trinity” of the Mundell-Fleming theorem
-stating that under the condition of full capital mobility, a government cannot pursue an
autonomous monetary policy and an autonomous exchange rate policy at the same time-
made the policies pursued in the 1970s to boost economic performance impracticable (see,
e.g., Obstfeld 1998; Scharpf 2000). Hence fiscal consolidation in order to prepare for the
EMU became a major policy stance in the 1990s.
 
Second, the increasing competition for foreign investment between member countries
-which is partly facilitated by decreasing transportation costs due to the removal of trade
barriers- as a means for fighting soaring unemployment rates in the 1990s made the
governments embark on corporate tax-cutting strategies. Governments thereby entered the
so-called tax quadrilemma (Ganghof 2001), which states that governments must sacrifice
either efficiency, comprehensiveness, or progressiveness of the tax system when competing
for international capital. Although this neither implies a race to the bottom nor necessarily
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touches upon the total level of revenues because it is possible to close loopholes for tax
evasion, it certainly makes it more difficult to simply match the rising costs of welfare
(mainly due to pensions and health care, which jointly account for up to 80 percent of total
social spending) by raising revenues.
 
I have to emphasize that other constraints of a more domestic nature play an important role
in the current welfare state problems. Pressure on the pension systems is increasing
because the percentage of the population receiving old-age pensions is growing. This
growth is due in part to the aging of the population and in part to labor market policies that
are sweeping older, less productive workers into early retirement. The aging of the
population as well as medical progress strain the financial base of the health system.
Improvements in productivity and outsourcing decrease the number of jobs in the
secondary sector while high levels of both social security contributions and reserve wages,
intended to facilitate the transformation of the economy by smoothening the reorientation
of workers, limit the number of jobs created in the less productive parts of the service
sector. Structural unemployment is the consequence. All these developments contribute to
decreasing the tax base and to increasing social spending.
 
Although certainly not the only causes, the two mechanisms attributable to the EMU
therefore also limit the ability of European countries to finance their commitments to social
spending by putting an end to deficit accumulation and make it necessary for countries to
“recalibrate” their welfare systems (Ferrera, Hemerijck, and Rhodes 2000b). Since a
revival of the Thatcherite policy of outright welfare state retrenchment in Britain (Pierson
1994) seems neither publicly acceptable nor easily applicable in the other EU member
countries, consolidation strategies are sought that nurture both the requirements for
competitiveness and social security. Such a new policy orientation would include robust
macroeconomic policies, wage moderation, employment-friendly and efficient taxation,
labor-market flexibility combined with income stability, upgrading in education, training,
and mobility, as well as strategies against poverty and social exclusion (Ferrera, Hemerijck,
and Rhodes 2000b: 433-437). In short, welfare state “recalibration” would imply an
increase in both flexibility and security at the same time.
 
 
3.2 EMU and Wage Coordination
 
A core element of the EMU is the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB), which is
given maximum independence in its monetary policy and the prime task of maintaining
monetary stability. This Europeanization of monetary policy reshuffles the actor
constellation in wage bargaining in the EMU countries, in particular in those countries that
relied on national wage coordination as a means to restrain wage pressure. From a formal
point of view, the relocation of monetary policy shifts the reference area for coordination
to the EU level, while neither trade unions nor employers associations have built up strong
organizations at the EU level. Therefore, wage setting is moved from centralized,
economy-wide bargaining to a territorially defined intermediate level (Soskice and Iversen
1998). A highly influential point of view, which has entered the literature as the “U-shape”
hypothesis, argues that both highly centralized and highly decentralized wage-setting
systems lead to less wage pressure than in intermediately centralized bargaining systems,
thereby creating the labor market conditions for high economic growth and high
employment. This results in a U-shaped curve if economic performance is plotted against
the centralization of wage bargaining, because centralized wage setters internalize the
inflationary or employment-reducing externalities of their wage policy while decentralized
wage setters must follow market logic since they have rather limited power (Calmfors and
Driffill 1988; Crouch 2000). Amendments to this view have proposed that wage policy
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depends on the constellation of either high or low levels of centralization and either
independent or dependent central banks (Hall and Franzese 1998), and that the U-shape is
reversed if it is made conditional on the policy of the central bank because of the allegedly
stronger impact of non-accommodating policy in the case of sectoral bargaining (Iversen
1999). A further modification from a more empirically oriented perspective has proposed a
hump shape in which pattern bargaining at the sectoral level outperforms other bargaining
modes but with a fat tail at the centralized side of the scale. Sectoral coordination is argued
to be superior in terms of performance because the bargaining agenda is not complicated
by the intersectoral equality considerations with which central agreements have to deal.
The performance effects of centralized bargaining modes are contingent on legal
frameworks (enforceability of central agreements, peace clauses) that help make
lower-level units more governable (Traxler and Kittel 2000; Traxler, Blaschke, and Kittel
2001).
 
Irrespective of the differences in approach, all contributions to this debate expect that the
EMU will make economy-wide coordination of wage bargaining more difficult. The
question is whether this will result in greater or lesser wage restraint. If the inflation rate is
set by the ECB, monetary policy cannot respond to all national wage agreements. Although
national bargaining units may agree on wage restraint, sub-national (sectoral) units, which
are even further from the European level, may be more tempted to embark on wage hikes
because increasing costs in their domain have a more limited impact on the policy of the
central bank. Therefore, some suspect that the inability to coordinate wage bargaining at
the European level might lead to further deregulation and decentralization (Calmfors et al.
2001).
 
However, one has to note that despite of the shift of monetary policy to the European
level, there remains “room to move” (Mosley 2000) at the national level. If non-centralized
wage coordination via pattern bargaining is well-suited to moderating wages (Kittel and
Traxler 2001) and national governments are able to adjust to the exigencies of monetary
restrictiveness at least partly via fiscal, structural, and related policies, then the impact of
shifting monetary policy to the EU level on the capacity to restrict excessive wage claims
may be limited.
 
Despite the basic consensus in the literature concerning the difficulty of economy-wide
coordination, there is disagreement over which bargaining systems are expected to fail to
contribute to wage moderation. Those who start from the proposition that Europeanization
implies a shift of the relevant macroeconomic domain, thus making central coordination
impossible, expect the previously highly centralized bargaining systems to fail, most
notably in Germany (Soskice and Iversen 1998). However, given the restrictive policy
provision of the ECB -if the modified view holds that the policy of the central bank has the
strongest impact on intermediately centralized wage bargainers (Iversen 1999)- one would
expect a constellation of sectoral coordination to lead to a stable policy of wage
moderation. This suggests that deliberate attempts at sectoral coordination may be
undertaken. Indeed, efforts by trade unions to coordinate their wage policy, if not at the
European level then at the sectoral level, have been observed and related to the EMU
(Gollbach and Schulten 2000), but these processes do not seem to develop at a quick pace.
 
Finally, those emphasizing the importance of the governability of bargaining for successful
macroeconomic coordination expect the countries that currently rely on singular efforts to
meet the EMU criteria to be most susceptible to wage pressure. The 1990s witnessed the
unexpected resurgence of corporatist-style concertation in the form of social pacts
concluded in those countries that were least expected to be able to do so because they
lacked the institutional framework for stable concertation (Schmitter and Grote 1997;
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Ebbinghaus and Hassel 2000). We can view these pacts as manifestations of the concerted
efforts to meet the convergence criteria in these countries. By addressing both labor
market and social security issues at the same time, they attempted to smooth the
adjustment. However, because they lacked the means to contain lower-level wage pressure
on which these pacts crucially hinge, the pacts may well fall apart as soon as the immediate
need for moderation has passed after the successful and irreversible transition to the
monetary union. This is most notably the case for Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (Kittel
and Traxler 2001; see also Crouch 2000: 216-217).
 
In other countries some efforts have been made toward dismantling bargaining institutions.
Some of the hitherto highly coordinated countries have decentralized their coordination
mode at least in part. But these processes started well before the EMU was even
conceived, and they are better explained by economic crises, be they domestic (Sweden,
the Netherlands), due to the collapse of the Soviet Union (Finland), or due to German
re-unification. Organized decentralization in Austria can be attributed to the smooth
functioning of the system during the 1980s and 1990s. The 1990s also witnessed increased
EU activity in the field of labor law that relies on cooperation by the social partners. The
interpretation of these developments is mixed. While one thread of thought in the literature
sees the explicit involvement of the social partners in EU decision making as an indication
of an ongoing process toward corporatist concertation (Falkner 1998), others are more
skeptical with regard to the real impact of these processes (Streeck 1994, 1998; Ziltener
1999). We can contend, however, that -together with the swing back from a conservative
majority in the European Council to social democratic one- this upgrading of the role of the
interest association has helped to gradually undermine the dominant ideology of a pure free
market economy. As a result, the social dialogue is now regarded as a legitimate alternative
to commission proposals and has become part of the ‘acquis’ of the EU (Vaughan-
Whitehead 2000).
 
Although we have seen that to date the EMU has challenged coordinated wage bargaining,
it has until now at best only shaken the coordinated systems while at the same time helped
increase the efforts at coordination in countries hitherto mired in serious labor conflicts.
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that the real test for the existing wage
bargaining systems is still to come once the adjustment process to the single currency has
been concluded.
 
 
3.3 EMU and Income Equality
 
Both of the above-mentioned developments have implications for income equality. Income
equality in the EU is relevant in two dimensions, within a country and between countries.
First, income equality within each country in Europe is among the highest in the world.
Wage coordination, in particular top-level agreements, has an equalizing effect on wages.
And the relatively high levels of reserve wages in Europe make employment at wages
below these levels impossible, thereby cutting off the lower end of the wage distribution.
Second, the variation in living standards between countries is still considerable, since the
southern countries, in particular Spain, Portugal, and Greece, trail behind. However,
convergence is occurring, and we have observed rapid upward developments in these
countries.
 
To the extent that EMU will, in the medium term, increase decentralization of wage
bargaining, in particular in those countries currently characterized by economy-wide
agreements, it will help widen the variation in incomes. One reason for the above-average
performance of sectoral pattern setting as compared to centralized bargaining is that
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negotiations at the sectoral level are hardly effected by economy-wide wage equality
(Traxler and Kittel 2000). To the extent that the EMU contributes to recasting welfare
systems, by putting pressure on reserve wages because governments are forced to find
ways to consolidate their budget by cutting costs and increasing employment, it will also
contribute to increasing income inequality. However, neither is the EMU the only force
pushing in that direction nor is widening income inequality the only possibility of
adjustment, albeit an important one (Scharpf 2000).
 
 
 
4 Enlargement and the European Social Model
 
4.1 Economic Effects of Enlargement
 
The upcoming admittance into the EU of the central and eastern European countries
(CEEC) is considered to be a precondition for the economic, social, and political
development of these countries. Stable democratic political systems, economic growth, and
social inclusion are mutually enforcing dimensions of societal development that are
believed by many to be much easier to maintain and to fortify inside the European Union
than outside of it. Also from the perspective of the EU, the chances for growth due to the
inclusion are regarded as considerable. However, the factor probably much more important
in the drive for enlargement is the hope for and prospect of peaceful co-evolution and
development, the core of the European idea. There is, therefore, ample reason to support
enlargement. Yet, enlargement also poses challenges to the acquis of the EU, ranging from
the adaptation of decision-making rules in the Council to the redesign of the common
agricultural policy (CAP) and the Cohesion Fund.
 
Among these challenges, the viability of the European Social Model is a prominent object
of concern. The immense increase in the variation of living standards within the EU upon
the entry of the CEE countries is expected by some to undermine social standards in the
EU. Table 1 presents some key indicators on living standards.
 
 
 Table 1 Living Standards: CEEC-10 and EU-15
 GNP
per capita
PPP-GNP
per capita
gross wages
and salaries
in % of EU-15
Bulgaria 6 21 6
Czech Republic 15 28 14
Estonia 15 28 14
Hungary 20 40 15
Latvia 11 26 10
Lithuania 12 24 13
Poland 16 33 17
Romania 7 42 14
Slovak Republic 17 42 14
Slovenia 42 64 46
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CEEC-10 15 32 15
 
Austria 124 113 102
Belgium 117 116 115
Denmark 154 118 157
Finland 112 100 107
France 115 111 101
Germany 120 103 151
Greece 54 64 51
Ireland 85 91 97
Italy 94 100 75
Luxembourg 202 185 133
Netherlands 115 107 110
Portugal 49 71 39
Spain 65 80 72
Sweden 119 97 145
United Kingdom 99 102 107
EU-15 100 100 100
 
Coefficient of variation EU-15 0,34 0,26 0,32
Coefficient of variation EU-15 + CEEC-10 0,75 0,53 0,73
 
Source: Boeri and Brücker 2001, Table 1; own calculations
  
 
In 1998, average per-capita GDP and gross wages and salaries in the CEEC were estimated
to be at 15 percent of the EU average, with only Slovenia reaching levels that were
comparable to those of the EU laggards (Portugal, Spain, and Greece). Measured in
purchasing power parities, the differences in economic development were still large, with
the CEEC average reaching only 32 percent of the EU average. Variation within the
EU-15, measured in poorest-to-richest ratios, is considerable: leaving Luxembourg aside,
Portuguese per-capita income equals 32 percent of Danish income, and the gross earnings
of the average Portuguese wage earner reach about 25 percent of those of his Danish
colleague. The respective ratios for Bulgaria are slightly below 4 percent. More generally,
the size of this challenge is illustrated by the observation that the USA and the EU-15
currently have similar coefficients of variation of approximately 0.3[1] in state and
national GDP, respectively, while adding the CEEC-10 to the EU-15 increases the
coefficient of variation by more than 100 percent to 0.75. Extrapolations based somewhat
arbitrarily on a convergence rate of 2 percent per annum predict that in 2037 the CEEC-10
will achieve an average GDP per capita of about 65 percent of the EU-15 (Weise et al.
2001: Annex 4).
 
Hence, enlargement will considerably increase heterogeneity in the EU, not only in
sociocultural terms but also economically and institutionally. But how significant are these
effects with regard to the viability of the European Social Model? An answer to this
depends on the expected implications for trade and foreign direct investment (FDI).
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Enlargement may challenge the European welfare states in several ways in terms of
coverage and financing, but also with regard to the development of social structures at the
EU level. More specifically, the admission of countries with substantially lower labor costs
may give the fears of social dumping new impetus. On the one hand, it is expected that
these countries may attract substantial foreign direct investment, thereby increasing the
pressure exerted on the social security systems of the rich EU countries by the lower-
income member countries and making the two groups of countries immediate competitors.
On the other hand, the huge differences in living standards are expected to induce labor
migration, thereby increasing the pressure in particular on the more generous welfare
systems.
 
While the large differences in labor costs may indeed be regarded as an impetus for
relocating plants to the CEEC, the real effects are expected to be minor. The current,
largely interindustrial, trade structure will only slowly adapt (with the EU exporting mainly
specialized-supplier, scale-intensive, and knowledge-based goods and importing mainly
labor- and resource-intensive goods) and depend on the speed of convergence
(Schumacher and Trübswetter 2000: 21). Intra-industrial trade is expected to increase only
in the longer term.
 
The FDI from the EU to the CEEC, equaling 0.8 percent of gross fixed investment in the
EU in 1998, is “too small to matter” for the EU as a whole[2], while the same volume
accounts for 25 percent of gross fixed investment in the CEEC, highlighting the asymmetry
of the trade relationship. Also, analyses of branch structures give little evidence of ongoing
relocation processes, as market access continues to be the main motive of investment
(Boeri and Brücker 2001: 9-10). From this perspective, the CEEC countries are better
characterized not as being a danger to European employment but as being the competitors
of far-eastern economies that will profit from their proximity to the rich EU core countries.
By contrast, economic forecasts tend to suggest that rising trade between the EU and the
CEEC should increase employment opportunities in both groups of countries (Schumacher
and Trübswetter 2000: 21). The only problem zones expected to arise are in low-wage
industries in the eastern border regions of Germany and, in particular, of Austria, although
the forecasts tend to emphasize the overall increase in employment also in those regions.
On the whole, these studies suggest that we should not expect extensive relocation
processes by firms seeking to lower labor costs.
 
However, findings from qualitative research are inconsistent with these forecasts. In
location decisions of industries with relatively high labor costs, like the automobile
industry, the combination of a low wage level and a relatively high level of qualification of
the workforce, combined with tax exemptions granted by the governments, make the CEE
countries rather attractive alternatives to EU locations (Stumpf-Fekete 2001: 435). In
addition, the lower labor standards in these countries make them candidates for regime
shopping (Streeck 1992) by transnational enterprises, thereby undermining the growth
perspectives of lower-income EU members. As soon as the last barriers to market entry fall
with EU admission, current reservations against investment in CEE countries may become
obsolete and predictions based on current levels of FDI may only indicate the minimum
level of actual development. In addition, the low transport costs from the CEEC to the EU
due to market proximity may make it profitable for a larger set of goods to be relocated to
cheaper production sites.
 
The long-term inequality of living standards is expected to lead to substantial labor
migration from the CEEC to the EU. Although the total of foreign residents who have
immigrated from the CEEC is estimated to have been the practically negligible number of
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850,000 (0.2 percent of the European population) in 1998, their distribution is highly
unequal with 80 percent residing in Germany and Austria (Boeri and Brücker 2001: 11).
Unrestricted labor mobility is expected to lead to an inflow of about 220,000 individuals to
Germany and 40,000 to Austria per year in the first couple of years. Further, surveys
suggest that about 11 percent of all citizens of CEE countries (or about 11 million people if
all ten applicants are admitted) are likely to leave their country as soon as free movement
of labor is permitted (Sinn 2000: 5). This amounts to 2.3 percent of the combined
population of the EU and the CEEC. These migrants will mainly offer blue-collar work in
manufacturing and unskilled labor in the service sector. Although they will compete with
the native labor force in these sectors, the pressure exerted on the employment
opportunities of natives will be mitigated by the tendency of the migrants to move to the
more prosperous regions. Over time, migrants are expected to adapt their skill profile also
to higher-skilled professions (Boeri and Brücker 2001: 13).
 
The migration effects of the upcoming round of enlargement cannot be compared to
previous admissions of lower-income countries to the EU because of the considerably
larger gap in living standards and the much closer proximity of centers of very high living
standards in current EU countries and regions of comparatively lower living standards in
the candidate countries. Perhaps a more realistic comparison might be the experiences at
the border between the USA and Mexico after the NAFTA agreement. However, this
comparison has not yet been explored in depth.
 
As far as Austria is concerned, the expectations are less concerned with migration per se
than with a considerable extension of the practice of commuting between the border
regions of the new member states and economic centers like Vienna, but also within the
border regions. This may exert pressures on incomes and job competition in these regions,
although the net effect is expected to be positive (Breuss 2001; Huber 2001; Mayerhofer
and Palme 2001b).
 
 
4.2 Enlargement and Social Security
 
I will now discuss the implications of enlargement for the three dimensions of the ESM in
more detail. Although there are rather clear trends, the actual size of the effects depends
on the accuracy of the forecasts.
 
If the quantitative forecasts on trade and FDI are correct, the amount of additional
pressure placed on the social security systems by the admission of the CEE countries to the
EU seems to be minor, in particular in comparison to the volume of social redistribution. To
the extent that rising trade indeed implies rising employment in both the EU and the CEEC,
the pressure on unemployment insurance funds may even decline. However, if the caveats
mentioned above are relevant and relocation becomes a major issue, unemployment may
strike the industries affected in EU countries at least for a transitory period, thereby
increasing the need for a social cushion under the condition of limited budgets.
 
While the migration of workers to the EU is not expected to result in direct challenges to
the social security system per se because eligibility is dependent on a certain period of paid
employment, at least in the countries currently most affected by migration, the low-wage
orientation of the immigrants is argued to pose a challenge to the welfare systems.
Assuming that the essence of the welfare state is redistribution from the rich to the poor,
low-wage workers are expected to benefit most from welfare transfers. While contributing
comparatively little to taxes and social insurance systems, low-income workers profit from
supplementary support, free schooling, full health care at lower rates, public housing, and
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tax-financed infrastructure. Hence, it is argued, the size of net social transfers to
low-income workers will become a prime determinant when migrants choose their country
of destination, thereby placing pressure on these transfers. “Systems competition in the
presence of free migration will take the form of lowering the net transfers of resources to
low-income workers, and this means at least a partial dismantling of the social welfare
state” (Sinn 2000: 7). According to this logic, low-income migrants are thought to prefer
countries with comparatively generous systems of redistribution, while those who are
called upon to finance the transfer payments will leave those countries, thereby threatening
the funding of the transfer system. Since preventing migration will harm the potential
welfare gains induced by an improved factor allocation, this perspective argues that
excessive migration incentives must be removed. The harmonization of social systems
would remove the incentive but eastern standards would be unacceptable to the EU and
western standards unaffordable to the CEEC. If selection criteria for migrants are also
ruled out by the free movement principle, the application of the home country principle is
regarded as the only means by which “access to the benefits of the western social systems
can be limited” (Sinn 2000: 11).
 
Apart from the lack of both normative and political tenability of this rationale, its
real-world relevance may be limited or offset by other factors affecting the choice of
destination. Among these are the proximity to the home country, labor market
opportunities, or the existence of ethnic colonies. Hence, the practical relevance of this
challenge is less definite than the economic logic suggests. In addition, it remains
questionable whether the average migrant’s behavior is well-captured by the assumed
benefit-maximizing function. However, the issue does have a political dimension that may
be much more important. Even the potential of net benefits for immigrants may increase
resistance to the redistributionist element in welfare state arrangements already visible in
the social stigmatization of the unemployed and people depending on welfare transfers.
Such sentiments may be expressed in increasing popularity not only of parties rallying
against welfare redistribution but also of xenophobic movements and parties fighting
against immigration as such. But again, existing evidence does not necessarily support such
a prediction. Although the northeastern districts of Austria are expected to be most
strongly affected by the admission of the CEE countries (and this process is already
visible), the popularity of the FPÖ in that region is clearly below its nationwide average[3].
Experience has also shown that a number of guest workers in Germany and Austria move
back to their home countries once they retire. So it is not at all clear that the net balance
between contributions and benefits should turn out to be negative for current EU members.
 
All in all, the effects of enlargement on the financing of European welfare states seem to
be limited by the relatively small size of the expected shifts given the current size of the
western European welfare states. But even small shifts may have a large impact if they can
be instrumentalized in a political controversy. In particular, the coverage of welfare
systems may be negatively affected, and the redistributionist element of the welfare state
may be reduced to the detriment of those most economically disadvantaged. One might
expect that such effects will be larger if conservative and xenophobic parties jointly push
for welfare state retrenchment. Current developments in the Austrian welfare state
underline the potential impact of such a redesign (Tálos 2001), although the upcoming EU
enlargement does not seem to be receiving a great deal of consideration. Therefore it is
important to acknowledge the politically disrupting potential of this challenge, particularly
in those countries that are currently the preferred destination of migrants, even though the
real significance of migration is open to doubt and its current impact limited.
 
What impact might enlargement have on the development of EU-level social policy? One
might argue that enlargement will increase the differences in social law and policy to such
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extent that it will become impossible to agree either on a common framework or on
common standards at a level acceptable to the countries endowed with a well-developed
welfare state.
 
However, there is less disparity between the traditions and legacies than one might think.
Like the EU countries, CEE countries are characterized by more or less encompassing
state intervention in the areas of welfare, but also in many policy areas connected to social
policy. During communist rule, most CEE countries developed social security systems that
cushioned practically all risks from the cradle to the grave for the large majority of their
citizens. These systems were functional within the framework of a planned economy, but
soon reached their limits during the transformation to the principles of market economies.
One core problem is a shortage of funds, aggravated by austerity measures and a growing
shadow economy as well as by widespread tax evasion that reduces social security
contributions and tax receipts. Other core problems are unclear responsibilities in the
administration, and an overcapacity of facilities and personnel that limit efficiency and
quality, particularly in health care (European Parliament 1998: 39-44). Thus, the welfare
states of the CEE countries face the consequences of underfunding and the ensuing
development of welfare provision via informal means.
 
Although all CEEC governments are working to adjust their welfare systems to the
exigencies of the market system, it remains to be seen how successful these varying reform
efforts will be (Deacon 2000; European Parliament 1998; Heller and Keller 2001). Despite
the efforts of the CEE countries to attract FDI by low capital taxation, none of them seem
to be headed toward a deliberate strategy of social dumping. This is manifest in the reliance
on payroll taxes to an extent similar to the EU countries (Deacon 2000: 158).
 
Admission to the EU, which implies entry into the EMU, will certainly not relieve the
CEEC governments from austerity policies, even if they do meet the Maastricht
convergence criteria. The budgetary restraints will remain while these countries adjust to
the acquis of the EU, including EU social standards. This is a major challenge for these
countries and has led to a considerable reorientation of policies (Tóth and Langewiesche
2000). But given the existing EU standards, the ambivalent scenario for improving welfare
provision in the CEEC suggested by the tension between ongoing budgetary restraints and
the need to attain EU standards will affect the current state of EU social policy less than
future developments. Given, too, that the transfer of social policy to the European level is
most advanced in particular areas of labor law (Falkner 1998), adjustment needs are most
pressing in these areas that do not directly affect government budgets.
 
However, one should not be overly pessimistic. The development of social policy in the
1980s and 1990s has shown a remarkable extension of activity at the EU level despite the
fact that one important member country, the UK, resisted many attempts at integrating
social policy (Pierson and Leibfried 1995: 452). As a result, the EU has started to develop
mechanisms to deal with the variety of interests and standards, among which “open
coordination” has become a major and promising component (Falkner 2002). Open
coordination consists of a system of coordination and monitoring that involves the
submission of reports to the European Commission and their discussion in the Council,
which creates peer pressure on the social laggards. The EU issues guidance principles that
are intended to induce reform processes in the member countries. Although little can be
said about the success and future potential of this approach, it is most likely to be the one
best suited to dealing with the variety of standards already existing in the EU. The
admission of the CEE countries adds further variation to an already high degree of
variation. Since the prospects for progress via regulation or financial incentives are dim, an
optimistic perspective would be to claim that this increased variation might well help
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advance the further development of open coordination because few other alternatives, if
any, are available. A more pessimistic view, however, might interpret the same observation
as an indication that tension will increase within the still fragile polity of the EU.
 
Although not considered part of the ESM and therefore not included in this review, the EU
financial support distributed via the CAP and the Cohesion Fund can be regarded as
elements of a broad concept of EU social policy since these payments either support the
living standard of the agrarian population or help improve economic development in
peripheral regions (see, e.g., Rieger 1996). Since enlargement will certainly increase the
number of eligible regions, the EU has the options of either increasing the budgets,
changing the eligibility rules to the advantage of the new member countries, or redesigning
the whole system of redistribution within the EU. Since increasing the budgets is limited by
the unwillingness of the net payers and changing the eligibility rules will be vetoed by the
net recipients, challenges for adjustment in these policy areas certainly add a further
dimension to the complexity of social policy in the enlarged EU (see, e.g., Weise et al.
2001).
 
 
4.3 Enlargement and Wage Coordination
 
To what extent does enlargement have an impact on wage coordination in European
countries? Challenges come from market integration and from migration. The admission of
CEE countries to the EU integrates a high wage region and a low wage region into a single
market. The removal of restrictions to imports from the CEEC increases the plausibility
that firms may relocate to the CEEC if social standards including wages are set at a level
that equalizes the overall utility assessment. While important aspects of this assessment are
market access, political risks, and unit labor costs, labor market and production regimes
become relevant aspects as soon as these factors are accounted for (Stumpf-Fekete 2001).
In particular, CEE countries may attempt to attract investment by containing union power
and by offering additional incentives like tax exemptions.
 
The challenge to industrial relations posed by enlargement-induced relocation is not
directly related to the amount of actual relocation. It is the larger plausibility of the
relocation option due to the integration of the CEEC that shifts the current wage
bargaining equilibrium to the advantage of employers. Evidence from large German
corporations suggests that internal competition from plants of the same firm located in
other countries has massively increased the occurrence of pacts for employment and
competitiveness in Germany (Rehder 2001). These pacts often tend to undermine
collective agreements and are regarded as indicative of an ongoing redesign of the German
collective bargaining system toward a more market-oriented regime.
 
Nevertheless, it remains unclear to what extent enlargement adds to the existing pressure
on the bargaining system. One might speculate that the option of relocation to the CEEC
gives additional impetus to the competition between plants. This may not only undermine
the high labor standards in the core EU countries, but also slow down the improvement of
labor standards in more peripheral countries where trade unions face even more credible
relocation threats, because the lower labor costs and more permissive labor standards in
these countries originally contributed to the decision to locate there in the first place
(Stumpf-Fekete 2001: 435).
 
Migration from the CEEC to the EU will increase the supply for blue-collar work and
unskilled employment in the service sector. Hence these workers will lose bargaining
power to the extent that labor supply increases. This may threaten to pull wages down and
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worsen labor conditions in such professions. Unlike the current situation, the supply of
relatively well-educated migrants will increase the pressure also at higher skill levels. But
since the employment of migrants in the host countries is subject to the same set of rules as
the employment of native employees, there is little additional reason to believe that
migration might undermine labor standards to a greater degree (Sinn 2000: 9).
 
In addition, if population forecasts for the EU countries are correct, the EU might in the
medium term witness a shortage of labor. Yet the effects of migration might be at least
partially offset by the decrease in the native labor supply (see Feld 2000).
 
With regard to the variety of wage coordination systems within the EU, the admission of
CEE countries implies an increase in the number of rather weak coordination systems (see
Schienstock, Thompson, and Traxler 1997; Kohl, Lecher, and Platzer 2000). Although the
trade unions in all CEE countries have made attempts at both increasing worker
organization and integrating different factions, they have been only partially successful.
Also, employers associations are highly differentiated. Even though these institutional
characteristics limit the ability of peak associations to engage in tripartite negotiations,
such efforts are paramount in the CEEC and seem to be capable at least to a certain extent
of helping to solve conflictual issues in the course of the transformation process. At the
macro level, differences between wage coordination modes in the EU countries, in
particular those of the more peripheral ones, and the CEEC are minor (Kohl, Lecher, and
Platzer 2000: 413) and do not substantively add to the existing problems of EU wage
coordination.
 
 
4.4 Enlargement and Income Equality
 
Contingent on the trends described in the previous two sections, we have to expect a
considerable increase in income inequality in Europe. In terms of vertical income
distribution, the increase in the supply of cheap labor within the EU willing to take on jobs
at the lower end of the skill pyramid -achieved either by triggering FDI to CEE countries or
by increasing the number of job applicants in the current EU countries- will pressure wages
to drop, especially at the lower end of the scale. In terms of sectoral wage differentiation, it
is to be expected that workers in those sectors particularly exposed to competition from the
CEE countries will experience more pressure to decrease their income than those in sectors
profiting from the increase in exports to these countries. Enlargement may not be regarded
as the prime cause of both developments. But it certainly makes the challenge more severe.
 
 
 
5 Conclusions
 
I have presented an overview of the literature relating to the challenges to the European
Social Model posed by EMU and the admission of the CEE countries and discussed the
possible implications of these contributions to the deepening and the widening of the EU
for the ESM. Since it is widely expected that the implications should be far-reaching, the
findings are somewhat startling.
 
First, instead of the expected push toward the abolition of welfare standards, the EMU has
to date accelerated and intensified the search for a recalibration of the welfare systems,
which tended to be subject to pressure anyway due to the aging of the population and the
increased speed of economic restructuring.
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Second, enlargement has been expected to increase the variation in social standards in the
EU. But the only breaking news in this respect is that the size of the already rather large
spectrum of variation will increase. EU policy makers have demonstrated remarkable
inventiveness in circumventing previous attempts at halting integration of social policy.
 
Third, instead of the expected final strike of EMU on collective bargaining and labor
market regulation, the astonished public has witnessed the reinvention of social pacts as a
means to achieve the EMU. These pacts have contributed to the search for a new power
equilibrium in the labor market. In addition, these pacts have helped the trade unions
steady their position in countries hitherto characterized by organizational fragmentation
and hefty disputes.
 
Fourth, enlargement will further shift the balance of power on the labor market toward the
employers, which might imply some deterioration of employment conditions in the EU,
most notably in incomes at lower skill levels. It may also add to the pressure on collective
bargaining regimes.
 
As far as the present overview suggests, both the EMU and enlargement alone do not seem
to challenge the ESM to a degree that might endanger its basic layout. Their joint effect,
however, may be more significant. The EMU limits deficit spending strategies for the EU
countries and imposes additional austerity demands on fiscal policy of the CEE countries
wishing to enter the EU. Enlargement is likely to increase competition in particular in the
lower and middle strata of the incomes scale, thereby increasing the demand for welfare
provision. Since the reform of welfare states is likely to confront both popular resistance
and opposition by vested interests, these two pressures may add up to a partial dismantling
of the welfare state to the detriment of the poor. Given the pressures on the collective
bargaining systems to open wage scales at the lower end -due both to the increased power
of employers as a result of enlargement and to a government strategy to fight
unemployment- the number of low-income workers may considerably increase. Hence, the
most likely result of the combined impact of the EMU and enlargement is an increase in
inequality in the countries hitherto attempting to maximize equity.
 
With regard to the CEE countries, the implications of the EMU for fiscal policy may
aggravate the the problems already present in these countries to raise social standards to
the EU level because of the restrictions imposed by the global financial markets. In
addition, these problems may undermine attempts to counter corruption and the growing
shadow economy, major problems hindering the integration of the CEEC economies into
the EU (despite similar problems in at least some of the EU countries).
 
To what extent these implications will materialize cannot be finally assessed at this point.
The EMU and enlargement certainly add even more pressure on the ESM than already
exists as the result of formershortsighted policy reforms, economic restructuring and
cyclical downturns, mismanagement, and population trends. The likelihood of thorough
reform is increased by these projects. This means that, despite the considerable efforts
necessary for adjustment, there are currently no clear and unambiguous signs that the fears
of those expecting a serious deterioration of the welfare state and the collective bargaining
system will come true. However, the danger is present and an inventive approach will be
needed to combat it.
 
The extent to which the concept of the EU gradually expanded from a means of
peacekeeping to a project of market liberalization and then to a particular concept of a
social model is impressive. All the more impressive is that this process is better
characterized as “muddling through” than as the result of a clear-cut strategy. Although the
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challenges of the enlargement process should not be underestimated, the ability of the EU
to adjust without sacrificing its acquis should not be underestimated either. Who would
have thought only a couple of years ago that social policy could ever be regarded as a
concern of EU policy making? The challenge is one of political will and inventiveness, not
an economic imperative.
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Endnotes
 
1    The coefficient of variation of GSP per capita in the USA is estimated from data from
the US Census Bureau and the US Bureau of Economic Analysis and refers to 1995.
 
2    Nevertheless, some regions (notably in Germany and Austria) and labor-intensive
industrial sectors (e.g., textiles) are already affected and may have considerably more
need to adjust than the EU average. In particular, low-wage trades in the service sector
in border regions will be exposed to considerable challenges (Mayerhofer and Palme
2001a: 682-686).
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3    While the FPÖ attained 26.9% of all votes for the national assembly in 1999, the
northern districts of Lower Austria (bordering the Czech Republic) reported between
19% and 21% and the eastern districts of that province (bordering the Slovak
Republic) reported between 23% and 25%. In the province of Burgenland (bordering
Hungary), the FPÖ reached an average of 21%. By contrast, in Carinthia, which
borders Slovenia, the FPÖ attained 38.6%, followed by Vorarlberg with 30.2%. The
deviant case of Carinthia could be explained by the combination of long-lasting,
though mostly latent ethnic conflict and the charismatic, populist leadership of former
FPÖ party leader and current head of the provincial government Jörg Haider
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